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Abstract 
 
  There have been spectacular large gifts by private individuals for overseas 
development in recent years, and remarkable numbers of people have responded to 
appeals by development charities.  The aim of this paper is to consider how such 
overseas giving is best modelled and the implications for public policy.  Existing 
theories of charitable giving provide insight but are not fully satisfactory as 
explanations of giving for development. A new “identification” approach to 
individual giving is proposed that combines the results focus of the public goods 
formulation with the scale of the warm glow model. The new model is used to 
examine the implications for public policy, including the extent to which official aid 
crowds out private giving and how public policy should respond to increased private 
willingness to make charitable transfers overseas. 
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1. Introduction: overseas giving 
 
  Giving by individuals for development has been illustrated by some 
spectacular examples. Bill Gates and Warren Buffett have made available for global 
development sums that are truly remarkable. But equally remarkable in scale is the 
number of people giving modest amounts for overseas development. In the UK, 1 
person in 10 is reported to be giving for development (Micklewright and Schnepf, 
2007).
2 The aim of this paper is to consider how such giving behaviour is modelled 
and the implications for public policy. How is overseas giving best interpreted?  Why 
do people not free-ride when there are millions of potential donors? What is the inter-
relation between private giving and government provision of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA)?  Does ODA crowd out private giving?  What should be the 
government response to increased private giving?   
 
The answers to these questions depend on (a) how we understand the 
determinants of individual giving for development, and (b) how we specify the social 
welfare function. This paper is concerned with both of these aspects. The literature on 
the economics of charitable giving, which dates back to Becker (1961), Boulding 
(1962) and Vickrey (1962), contains valuable insights, such as the difference between 
concerns for the “public good” and the personal benefit that people derive from the 
act of giving (“warm-glow”). This distinction provides a point of departure in section 
2 of the present paper, but I argue that, taken on their own, neither the public good nor 
the warm glow models are fully satisfactory in the specific case of overseas 
development. In section 3, I suggest a new “identification” approach to individual 
giving in the case of development, which combines the results focus of the public 
goods formulation with the scale of the warm glow model. In section 4, I examine the 
implications for public policy, including the extent to which ODA crowds out private 
giving and the optimal determination of the level of ODA, where giving for 
development raises specific issues for the specification of social welfare. The final 
section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Standard models of charitable behaviour applied to overseas giving 
 
The standard model of charitable giving employed by economists (see the 
survey by Andreoni, 2006) assumes that individuals maximise the utility derived from 
private consumption and from charitable donations.  The utility from donations has 
been assumed to take one of two main forms. The first is that derived directly from 
the act of giving, which has come to be known as the “warm-glow” (Andreoni, 1990); 
the second is derived from the achieved results of the gift, referred to as the “public 
good”.  In the first case, a person derived utility from giving to the Tsunami Appeal; 
in the second case, the person derived utility from the fact that Tsunami victims are 
being helped. As has been demonstrated in the literature, these two motives for giving 
can have quite different implications.  This is evident even without any formal 
analysis, as may be seen from asking how far official giving “crowds out” private 
giving? The extent of government aid to the victims does not affect the warm glow 
                                                 
2 In the US, according to Giving USA 2002, “international” accounted for some 4 per cent of the giving 
identified by cause other than that for religion (Havens, O’Herlihy and Schervish, 2006, page 561). 
  2that the person derives from his or her contribution, so that, on this basis, there is no 
crowding out. But, with the public good motive, government aid reduces the urgency 
of the public good case for giving, and hence tends to reduce the contributions by 
individuals. The distinction is therefore important. 
 
Which, if either, of these two models is more applicable to giving for 
development? 
 
 
The Warm-Glow Motive 
 
  On a purely warm-glow approach, individual utility is derived from private 
consumption and from the contribution of gifts to development, denoted by d. The 
person has a gross income, y, which is subject to tax at a proportional rate, t.  A 
fraction θ of the gift is assumed to be tax deductible, so that net income is equal to y-
t(y-θd), and the net cost of the gift in terms of foregone consumption is d(1-tθ).  In 
order to provide some mathematical shape to the model, I assume that the utility 
function is additive and logarithmic: 
 
U ≡ (1−α) log{y(1-t)–d(1-tθ)} + α log{1 + d/d0}      ( 1 )  
 
The first term measures the utility from consumption.  The second term measures the 
utility from donations and is zero if the person does not make any gift.   α (0 ≤ α < 1) 
and d0 (≥0) are constants that represent preferences for giving.  The level of gifts that 
maximises U is given by 
 
d = αy(1-t)/(1-tθ)−(1−α)d0   where this is positive, otherwise zero     (2) 
 
The coefficient α measures the marginal propensity to give out of an extra £ of 
income. If, in the absence of tax relief, the person tithes a tenth of extra net income, 
then α = 0.1.  But the person is only assumed to do this if their income is sufficiently 
large. This is the role of d0, which governs the threshold income level at which the 
person begins to give. As the degree of tax deductibility rises, the threshold income 
falls and the marginal propensity to give increases.  
 
The theoretical framework set out above can be used to derive various policy 
implications, such as the optimal tax treatment of charitable donations (see, for 
example, Atkinson, 1976 and Diamond, 2006). However, the model assumes that the 
donor is completely unconcerned with the use made of the gift and with the 
effectiveness of charitable activity. This assumption is particularly unappealing in the 
case of giving for overseas development. In the debates about aid for development a 
key role is played by issues of “effectiveness”. A reason frequently advanced for not 
giving is that the money is wasted: it disappears in administrative costs or is lost in 
corruption. People may share the goal of wishing to aid poor countries but lack 
confidence in the means. Qualitative research (Atkinson and Eastwood, 2007) has 
shown the role played by negative stories about misgovernment in dissuading people 
from giving for development. It does indeed seem reasonable to assume that, in the 
case of development, a primary preoccupation of donors is with the usefulness of their 
contribution. This brings us to the “public good” model. 
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Public Good Motives 
 
  If giving behaviour depends on the achieved results, then a wider set of factors 
have to be taken into account. In addition to the leakages just discussed, the impact on 
the public good depends on the contributions of the (n-1) other donors and of the 
government. Suppose that the per capita consumption of the r recipients, assumed to 
be all identical, is π in the absence of private gifts or ODA. This is then augmented by 
the individual gift, d, plus the total given by others, divided by r. The total given by 
others is made up of the giving by the other (n-1) donors averaging δ per person and 
of gn contributed by the government in ODA. However, a certain proportion ℓ of the 
total given is lost in leakage.  As a result, the per capita consumption of the r 
recipients becomes π+(1-ℓ)[d + δ(n−1)+gn]/r. 
 
How does this enter the utility function for an individual donor?  The “public 
good” in this case is not a single public facility, like a park or a hospice, but involves 
the consumption of r recipients.  It is possible that the donor acts as a utilitarian, 
adding to the utility from personal consumption the utility of all r recipients. This 
would however mean that the maximand is dominated by the latter terms as r 
becomes large: there would be a sum taken over 1 donor and millions of recipients.  
On the face of it, this does not seem a reasonable assumption, and a more natural 
parallel to the pure public good approach is to add a term representing the average 
consumption of the recipients, again weighted by a preference parameter α: 
 
U ≡ (1−α) log{y(1-t)–d(1-tθ)}+α log{π+(1-ℓ)[d + δ(n−1)+gn]/r}    (3) 
 
 
Suppose that the person takes as fixed the amounts given by others and by the 
government. The utility maximising choice of d by the individual becomes 
  
d = αy(1-t)/(1-tθ) - (1-α){δ(n−1)+gn} - r(1-α)π/(1-ℓ) 
  
where  this  is  positive,  otherwise  zero        (4) 
 
The giving function (4) is of the same mathematical form as before, with the intercept 
depending on the giving of others and on the amount of ODA. From this, we can 
immediately how there may be crowding out. Suppose that there is an increase of £1 
in total government support (gn). From (4), we can see that the individual is predicted 
to reduce giving by all but a proportion α of this increase (or to reduce giving to zero). 
So, with α = 1/10, there is 90 per cent crowding out. Put another way, the overall total 
of assistance is 
 
d+δ(n−1)+gn = α[y(1-t)/(1-tθ)+δ(n−1)+gn] - r(1-α)π/(1-ℓ)     (5) 
 
The person treats the increase in gn as an increase in total resources and “spends” a 
fraction α on development assistance. (No allowance is made here for any taxes 
necessary to finance the increase in g; if taxes are increased, this will have an 
offsetting effect in reducing y, and the degree of crowding out will be larger.)   
 
  4It may be seen from (4) that the amount given is a decreasing function of the 
extent of leakage (ℓ).  The greater the rate of leakage, the higher the threshold for 
giving. The model therefore captures the observation that increased leakages make 
people less willing to support development charities. The threshold also increases 
with r, to an extent that does not seem realistic. The total consumption of recipients 
(rπ) will dominate y which is one person’s income. In this respect, the model does not 
seem appropriate for giving for development where large numbers of potential 
recipients are a very evident feature. Everyone knows that the number of people living 
below the World Bank poverty line is measured in hundreds of millions. Whereas a 
cheque for $10,000 will make a material difference to the financing of a local hospice 
at home, it would not, on its own, make a material difference to the solution of world 
poverty. 
 
 
Public goods and large numbers of donors 
 
In addition to large numbers of recipients, there are large numbers of potential 
donors, an aspect which has led to criticism of the public goods approach by Sugden 
(1982) and others.  To discuss this, we need to take into account the responses of 
other donors. The term δ is the result of the decisions of others about their values of d. 
The outcome depends on what an individual believes about the behaviour of others. 
The standard assumption in the economics literature is that made above: i.e. people 
determine their giving assuming that the behaviour of others is independent of their 
own decision (a “Nash” assumption).  Suppose that this holds, as may indeed be 
plausible where n is large. If everyone is identical, then δ = d, and we can solve for 
the value of d, where there is an interior solution:   
 
d = αy(1-t)/(1-tθ)/[n(1-α)+α] – (1-α){g+(r/n)(π/(1-ℓ)}/[(1-α)+α/n]     (6) 
 
In the literature on charitable giving, attention has focused on large n, but, as we have 
just noted, in the case of giving for development, r is also large. It therefore makes 
sense to focus on their ratio, denoting r/n by σ.  If σ is fixed, then, as n rises, everyone 
reduces their donations. For a fixed g (>0), the threshold income level rises, so that 
fewer and fewer people give. The larger the number of potential donors, the more 
willing people are to “free ride” on the contributions of others.
3 Indeed, as n tends to 
infinity, individual giving goes to zero.
4 This is why Andreoni summarised the 
literature as saying that, as the number of people rises “warm-glow will become the 
dominant if not the exclusive motive for giving” (2006, page 1223). Given the large 
number of potential donors to fund world development, the public good model does 
not seem adequate. As Sugden argued many years ago, “the public good theory of 
philanthropy is untenable as an explanation of the behaviour of those people who 
contribute to large charities” (1982, page 348).  
 
  Taken on their own, neither the public good as formulated here nor the warm 
glow models seem therefore satisfactory as a basis for analysing giving for 
                                                 
3 As discussed by Jones and Posnett (1993, page 135), free-riding may be less with alternatives to the 
Nash assumption. If contributors expect that increases in their own giving will stimulate others to give 
more, then the degree of free-riding is reduced.  
4 Andreoni (1988) shows that, with individuals differing in income, as n increases, there are positive 
total donations but the proportion of the population who give, and the average gift, tend to zero.  
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is consistent with positive private giving in the presence of large numbers of potential 
donors and recipients. In the next section I suggest an alternative that blends the two 
approaches. 
 
 
3. The “identification” model 
 
  A combination of the warm-glow and public goods formulations seems more 
relevant to the case of giving for development. Melding the scale of the warm-glow 
approach with the results focus of the public goods formulation yields an explanation 
of giving in the case of large populations that seems to capture the way in which 
giving is presented by charitable agencies. In what I shall call “the identification 
approach”, the donor is assumed to be concerned with the impact on the living 
standards of the recipients; it is not enough simply to put the cheque in the envelope. 
But the donor does not regard the cheque as being divided among millions of potential 
recipients. The donor is assumed to visualise a single recipient or a family or a 
village. Such a visualisation is indeed much promoted by development charities, and 
is made concrete in programmes where donors “adopt” families, to whom the transfer 
is channelled. Even where there is no explicit adoption, donors often are encouraged 
by development charities to “identify” with the situation of recipients on a one-to-one 
or one-to-m basis, where m is a small number. “It only takes $X to do Y” is a common 
marketing strategy. The “giving a goat” campaign had considerable resonance.   
 
The identification approach may be formalised by writing the utility function 
as 
 
U ≡ (1-α) log{y(1-t)–d(1-tθ)}+αm log{π+(1−ℓ)d/m}      ( 7 )  
 
The potential donor attaches a weight α to the welfare of each of the m recipients, 
where their welfare depends on the recipient’s own resources, denoted by π and the 
amount given after leakage and divided by the number of perceived recipients.  The 
resulting level of giving is 
  
d =  {αy(1-t)/(1-tθ)−(1−α)π/(1−ℓ)}/[(1-α)/m+α] 
  
where  this  is  positive;  otherwise  zero        (8) 
 
  Since the number of potential donors, n, does not directly enter (8)), the 
identification model may appear closer to that of warm-glow. In some respects, the 
giving relation is indeed similar. But there are significant differences. First, the 
amount given depends on the perceived situation of the recipients, via the term π. 
Here there may be an impact of the media and NGOs. If the activities of bodies such 
as the Commission for Africa or of development charities make potential donors more 
aware of the low levels of living, then this will increase both the proportion of donors 
and the amount given.  Secondly, the number of recipients per donor, m, affects the 
amount given but not the threshold. If donors extend their range of concern, 
increasing m, then this increases the level of giving. Suppose α = 0.1. Then, with m = 
1, the term in square brackets in (8) is equal to 1; with m = 3, it is equal to 0.4, so that 
the amount given is 2½ times higher. 
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Large numbers 
 
  The potential number of donors and the extent of government aid do not enter 
(8) directly, but indirectly via the term π, the perceived living standard of the recipient 
in the absence of giving. Suppose that, in the identification model, the potential donor 
envisages a single recipient (m = 1), say a village, out of a potential total of r villages. 
The donor sees the gift as allowing a programme to be “extended to another village”. 
On this approach, other donors are seen as helping other villages; the amount given 
by others does not affect the utility derived by the donor. On the other hand, the 
potential donor does see the living standard of his or her village in the absence of the 
gift being affected by ODA. ODA equal to g per head of potential donors (making a 
total gn) is assumed to be spread over the r villages. Let us assume that the perceived 
effectiveness of ODA is (1-λ) times that of individual donations, where λ may be 
positive or negative. So the effective transfer is (1-ℓ)(1-λ)gn/r per village, and hence 
the perceived standard of living in the absence of an individual gift to the village with 
which the donor identifies is 
 
π = π0 + (1-ℓ)gn(1-λ) / r         (9) 
 
The constant π0 denotes the standard of living in the absence of any aid or giving. In 
what follows, I assume that m=1. The level of giving is then
5: 
 
d =  αy(1-t)/(1-tθ)–(1-α)π0/(1-ℓ)–g(1-α)(1-λ)/σ  or  zero    (10) 
 
Giving is positive where income exceeds a threshold level that depends on 
preferences and a number of parameters, including σ = r/n, which may be seen as an 
indicator of the scale of the problem. As argued earlier, it is of the essence of giving 
for development that both n and r are large, but their ratio may differ. If the 
populations of potential donors and of potential recipients are broadly matched, then σ 
= 1; if donors fall short, then σ is greater than 1 and vice versa. It may be noted that 
the population of the countries that currently belong to the OECD Development 
Assistance Committee is quite similar (a little less than 1 billion) to the estimated 
number of people living below the MDG target level of $1 a day.  
 
 
Summary 
   
  The “identification” model combines the scale of the warm-glow approach 
with the results focus of the public goods formulation to yield an explanation of 
giving where there are large numbers of potential recipients and large numbers of 
potential donors. The level of giving is a simple linear function of income on account 
of the assumptions made, but both the slope and intercept reflect some of the key 
determinants, as summarised in Figure 1. Moreover, the underlying motivation seems 
close to the way in which giving is envisioned by charitable agencies and approached 
in their campaigning activities.  
                                                 
5 The level of giving is similar to that obtained with the “utilitarian” version of the public goods model, 
but with the significant difference that it is uninfluenced by the level of giving by other private donors. 
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Giving for 
development
Income
Figure 1  Giving for Development in “identification” model
Slope depends positively on α
(tastes), and tθ (tax relief)
negatively on t (tax rate)
Intercept depends 
negatively on α (tastes), tθ (tax relief), 
σ (perceivedscale of the problem) 
and λ (relative inefficiency of ODA)  
positively on π0 (perceived position 
of recipients), l (leakage), t (tax rate) 
and g (extent of ODA)
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4. Implications for public policy 
 
  This section considers the two-way interaction between private giving and 
public policy.  The first issue, already evoked, concerns the ways in which policy 
affects private donations.  Crowding out has already been discussed, but public policy 
also affects charitable giving in general via tax relief.  Moreover, public policy can 
influence the channelling of private giving towards specific causes via its coverage of 
different needs. The second issue concerns the reverse interaction.  How should 
changes in private giving affect government policy towards the determination of the 
levels of ODA?  If individuals give more overseas, should governments give less or 
should they give more?  I am concerned here with normative, rather than political 
economy, arguments, and this requires us to consider the appropriate form of the 
social welfare function in the presence of private giving overseas.   
 
 
Crowding out 
 
As we saw earlier, in the public goods model all but a fraction α (or smaller) 
of an increase in g was crowded out.  In the case of the identification model, we can 
see from (10) that the sum of d and g increases with g according to [1-(1-α)(1-λ)/σ]. 
The second element measures the degree of crowding out, and decreases with all three 
of the parameters: the taste for giving, the perceived relative inefficiency of ODA, and 
the scale of the problem. 
 
If the private donor sees ODA as equally efficient (λ=0), and donors and 
recipients are equally matched (σ=1), then all but α is again crowded out. But the 
degree of crowding out is less if donors regard ODA as less effective.  With σ=1 and 
(1-α) close to 1, the degree of crowding out is close to (1-λ), so if the relative degree 
of effectiveness is 50 per cent, then the crowding out is around a half. In the limit, if 
people believe that governments are totally ineffective, then there is no crowding out. 
If the government takes measures to persuade the public of the relative effectiveness 
of ODA, then this may have a negative impact on the level of private donations. 
  
  The degree of crowding out depends also on the perceived scale of the 
problem. If the private donor sees ODA as equally efficient (λ=0), and potential 
donors and recipients are seen as matched (σ=1), the degree of crowding out is (1-α), 
or close to 1.  If the scale of the problem is perceived as double (σ=2), then the 
crowding out is halved. This alerts us to another issue: the difference between the 
policy of a single donor country and the policies of all donor countries collectively. If 
the recipients are viewed as world-wide, whereas the ODA is being provided by a 
subset of donors, then this serves to raise σ. There is more likely to be crowding out 
from a general agreement among all Development Assistance Committee members to 
raise ODA than from the decision to raise ODA by a single country.    
 
 
Tax relief 
 
  An increase in the proportion, θ, of gifts allowed as a tax deduction has the 
effect of increasing individual giving; it has however a cost in terms of foregone 
  9revenue.  If we suppose that the lost revenue is subtracted from ODA, then the net 
effect is given by the change in d(1-tθ). From equation (10), with everyone identical, 
we can see that this is positive: an increased charitable deduction raises the net 
transfer.  It should however be stressed that this is an artefact of the particular 
functional form, which constrains the “price” elasticity to be greater than 1.  An 
alternative functional form could give the reverse answer.  
 
 
Public awareness and perceptions 
 
  If the government wishes to stimulate private giving for development, then it 
can do so by persuading the public that both private giving and ODA are more 
effective as a result of reduced leakages.  From (10), we can see that reducing ℓ has 
the effect of increasing d. Reducing the perceived leakage from a half to a third has 
the effect of reducing the term subtracted by a quarter.  In this respect, positive 
publicity surrounding ODA will work in the direction of increasing private overseas 
giving. 
 
The government can increase public awareness of the scale of the 
development problem.  This can operate in two ways.  From (10), giving is an 
increasing function of σ, so that government (as well as development charities) can 
increase private giving by making people aware that the problem is one of large scale. 
In the same way, the government can make people aware of the low current levels of 
living (π0), which has the effect of raising giving. 
 
 
Social welfare in the presence of private giving 
 
  I now consider the position of the government of a single country of ν (less 
than n) potential donors, where the transfers via private giving or ODA are made to r 
recipients who are overseas. How should its policy with regard to ODA be influenced 
by changes in private giving? Here I am concerned with the normative arguments, so 
that we need to begin by considering the national social welfare function of this donor 
country. 
 
  The national social welfare function is assumed here to be the sum of elements 
corresponding to individual welfares. (It would also be interesting to examine non-
welfarist approaches.)  I assume initially that the population consists of ν identical 
individuals, all with the same income, the same taste parameters, and the same 
perceptions of the development problem. In the identification model (with m =1), the 
individual utility function, maximised by the individual donors, is made up of two 
elements: 
 
U ≡ (1-α)log{y(1-t)–d(1-tθ)}+αlog{ π0 +(1-ℓ)g(1-λ)/σ+(1−ℓ)d}   (11) 
 
  -------- A ----------    ------------- B  ------------------ 
 
How should the two elements (A and B) enter the national social welfare 
function? Different positions have been taken. The first position is simple: the social 
welfare function aggregates the individual utility derived from consumption, and 
  10ignores the concern for others embodied in the second term.  We only sum the terms 
A. This has obvious appeal in certain situations. If the second element captured 
negative feelings towards others, then we would have little hesitation in ignoring such 
feelings of jealousy. But there are also those who argue that we should ignore the 
second term where the feelings are positive. In his discussion of warm glow 
preferences for giving for public goods, Diamond notes that “the fact that warm glows 
improve the description of individual behaviour does not necessarily imply that social 
welfare should be defined including warm glows” (2006, page 915).  In part, his 
counter-arguments are specific to the warm glow formulation, treating it as a concern 
with process rather than outcome, whereas here I have adopted an outcome 
interpretation of giving for development. But in terms of outcomes, too, Diamond is 
critical of the inclusion of the second term. In part, his argument, drawing on 
Hammond (1987), is that inclusion of these private redistributive motives involves 
double counting, since the consumption by others is already included in the social 
welfare function. In the present case, however, there is no double counting since the 
recipients are assumed to be in a different country. The only way in which they can 
enter is via the second term, B. 
 
 
Optimal ODA 
 
  In view of these considerations, I take the case where the national social 
welfare function contains both elements: it is the sum of U.  This has the implication 
that variations in d have no first-order impact on social welfare, since individual 
donations are chosen to maximise U. Where donations are tax deductible, changes in 
d do affect the government budget constraint, which is given by, where νR0 is the total 
revenue required for other purposes: 
 
gν + R0ν = t(y-θd)ν         ( 1 2 )      
 
It follows that the tax rate has to be adjusted to finance increases in g according to 
 
[(y-θd)-tθ∂d/∂t] dt/dg = 1 – tθ (-∂d/∂g)      ( 1 3 )  
 
Differentiating U with respect to g, and substituting for dt/dg, shows that social 
welfare increases or decreases with a rise in g according to  
 
U2 (1-ℓ)(1-λ)/σ   > or <  U1 [1 – tθ (-∂d/∂g)]/  [1-tθ∂d/∂t/(y-θd)]   (14) 
 
In this expression, U1 denotes the derivative of U with respect to consumption and U2 
the derivative with respect to the consumption of the recipient. The general first-order 
condition for individual choice of giving is that 
 
(1-ℓ) U2 = (1-tθ) U1   or   (1-ℓ) U2 < (1-tθ) U1 and d = 0    (15) 
 
Where private donations are positive, the condition for social welfare to increase with 
g becomes 
 
 (1-λ)/σ (1-tθ) >  [1 – tθ (-∂d/∂g)]/[1-tθ∂d/∂t/(y-θd)]     (16) 
 
  11Where there is no tax relief for donations (θ=0), the condition reduces to a 
simple comparison of effectiveness. Increases in ODA raise social welfare if ρ ≡ (1-
λ)/σ > 1. This means that, even where ODA is regarded as just as effective as private 
charity (λ=0), this condition can only be satisfied where σ is less than 1: i.e. the scale 
of the problem has to be within the reach of the donor population. In interpreting this 
condition, we have to bear in mind that σ is now (r/ν), and that the contribution of a 
single country is less than that of all donors. The parameter ρ may be seen as a 
measure of the overall impact of ODA on securing improved living standards for the 
village with which the representative donor identifies, relative to that of private 
giving. This impact may of course be greater if the country targets its ODA towards 
countries with which its citizens identify. It should also be noted that the formulation 
of social welfare in terms of individual utility has the consequence that it is perceived, 
rather than actual, effectiveness of ODA that determines the optimal response. 
 
  If we now assume from this point that full tax relief is given (θ=1), as is 
indeed the case in many countries, the expression (16) also simplifies, since d does 
not depend on the tax rate. With the specific logarithmic form of the utility function 
used here, 
 
∂d/∂g = - (1-α)ρ         ( 1 7 )  
 
Substituting into (16), and re-arranging, the condition for social welfare to increase 
with g becomes 
 
 tα < 1 – 1/ρ          (18) 
 
ODA has to be more effective, in the sense described earlier, for the right hand side to 
be positive, and the tax rate required to raise revenue for other purposes has to be 
sufficiently small. On the other hand, with a small private willingness to support 
overseas development (α small), (18) may be satisfied for all t. An interior solution 
for t only exists where 1 < ρ < 1/(1-α).  Where there is an interior solution, the tax 
rate and level of ODA are given by 
 
t = (1- 1/ρ)/α   and    g = [(1-α)(1-1/ρ){y+π0/(1-ℓ)}-αR0] / [1-ρ(1-α)]   (19) 
 
The tax rate and g rise with the impact of ODA (ρ), and are lower the greater private 
willingness to give for development (α).  The latter is not evident, as an increase in α 
both raises private donations, reducing the need for ODA, and increases the weight of 
the welfare of recipients in the social welfare, which operates in the opposite 
direction. Increased need for revenue for other purposes (R0) reduces the level of 
ODA, there being no change in the tax rate.
6 Conversely, an increase in the level of 
income (y) leaves the tax rate unchanged but a fraction of the increase is allocated to 
ODA.  
 
 
                                                 
6 One purpose of the revenue requirement may be to finance a tax exemption (or basic income). 
Mirrlees (2005) describes how in a population with different income levels an increase in ODA may 
optimally be financed by a reduction in the tax exemption level (basic income) rather than by an 
increase in tax rates. He gives conditions for the optimal linear tax rate being independent of the level 
of government expenditure.    
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  In the case where everyone is identical, and all give or no one gives, it is not 
surprising that the main factor influencing the optimal level of ODA is a comparison 
of relative effectiveness. I now assume that the population consists of two types, one 
type are potential donors, and the other type have α = 0 and make no donations. The 
former are assumed to be a fraction γ of the population.  Social welfare is the sum of γ 
times the utility of donors, where there are two components, and (1-γ) times the utility 
of non-donors, in which case there is simply the utility derived from consumption. 
 
  Where there is no tax deductibility, the condition for an increase in g above 
zero to raise social welfare becomes  
 
ρ > 1 + [(1-γ)/γ][1+ {π0/y(1-ℓ)}/(1-t)]        ( 2 0 )  
 
There is a higher hurdle to cross (previously the condition was ρ>1) for two reasons. 
The first is that assistance to people in need abroad now receives less weight in the 
social welfare function, since only a fraction γ attach value to this aid. The second is 
that the marginal cost of foregone consumption is now higher for the (1-γ) non-
donors. On the other hand, we can see that an increase in the proportion of private 
donors, γ, has the effect of lowering the hurdle.  In this sense, the government should 
respond by increasing ODA if there is increased support for development charities. 
 
 
How should governments respond to increased individual giving? 
 
  In recent years there has been heightened awareness of the needs of 
developing countries. For example, the Commission for Africa, chaired by Tony 
Blair, widely publicised the ways in which Africa is being left behind by global 
development. If this has led to a shift in private willingness to give for overseas 
development, how – if at all – should government policy react? 
 
  From the earlier results, we can see that the effect could go either way.  Where 
everyone is identical, and already giving, a rise in the weight α attached to the utility 
derived from aid has the effect, in the interior case, of lowering the tax rate chosen 
and the level of ODA.  The more weight people attach to development, and the more 
that they give, the less the case for ODA. There is reverse crowding out. On the other 
hand, we have just seen that a rise in the proportion of donors (a rise in γ) has the 
effect of making it more likely that an increase in ODA has a positive effect on social 
welfare, and raises the tax rate chosen where there is an interior solution.  
 
  This section’s discussion of optimal policy design has led to a number of 
results, but it serves also to highlight a number of issues surrounding the welfare 
criterion applied.  I have already referred to the debate surrounding the inclusion of 
the private utility derived from giving for development, and to the use of perceptions 
of aid effectiveness. We need also to consider the relative treatment of citizens within 
the donor country.  As has been discussed by Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007), the proper 
treatment of donors and non-donors raises a number of serious issues.  Do we 
measure inequality within the donor country taking account of the utility derived from 
giving? 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Neither of the standard models of charitable behaviour used by economists 
appears wholly satisfactory as a basis for explaining giving for development. We need 
to combine the scale of the warm-glow approach with the results focus of a public 
goods formulation to yield an explanation of giving in the case of large populations. I 
have suggested a new “identification” model that provides one way in which this can 
be done. This model can explain individual giving for development in a world where 
there are large numbers of potential recipients and large numbers of potential donors. 
The model introduces a number of elements missing from the standard treatments of 
charitable giving, including the extent of leakage and perceived effectiveness of 
official development aid.  
 
  The identification model provides a framework to examine a number of key 
public policy issues.  Do government transfers in the form of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) crowd out private giving?  It has been shown that if the 
government demonstrates greater efficiency in the application of ODA this may 
reduce individual giving, but that if government makes people more aware of the 
scale of the problem, this has the reverse effect. The model has been used to 
characterise the optimal level of ODA. It throws light on the response of government 
giving to increased willingness by individuals to provide private help for 
development. The normative conclusions do however raise issues concerning the 
specification of the welfare function that need to be further discussed.      
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